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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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France-Algeria: Leaders of the provisional Algerian government have indicated that the rebels will ask their Swiss intermediaries to seek a resumption of negotiations with the French. Although both sides seem to desire negotiations, there are indications that the rebels do not feel as much urgency as the French to reach an early settlement. Rebel leaders have also indicated uncertainty and suspicion as to the actual extent of De Gaulle's concessions on the Sahara, and resumed negotiations could founder on this or other issues.

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Ghana: Conservative elements of Nkrumah's regime led by Minister of Health Gbedemah now appear determined to force a showdown with Nkrumah over Ghana's increasing ties with the bloc and the growing influence of certain leaders of the regime's left wing, notably Minister for Presidential Affairs Adamafio. They are also pressing Nkrumah to eliminate or modify the new tax and forced-savings measures imposed in July. These measures have been the main cause of the wave of strikes which began on 4 September and are continuing despite Nkrumah's recent personal appeal to the strikers to return to work.

a bitter fight between the moderate and extremist factions at a cabinet meeting the day before apparently ended in Adamafio's confirmation in a new position which will give him direct influence over the implementation of Ghana's ambitious development program.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea - Japan: The South Korean military regime, acting more vigorously than any of its predecessors to normalize relations with Japan, has instructed its minister to Japan to propose that formal negotiations be opened by 10 October. Seoul has indicated an increasing realization of the economic benefits of settling its long-standing difficulties with Tokyo, although distrust of Japanese intentions runs deep. The Japanese Government has responded cautiously to Seoul's overtures. [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 5)

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DAILY BRIEF

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.]

[Berlin - East Germany: The East German regime appears to be entering a period of consolidation, intensifying sector and zonal border security and reinforcing its control of the population. While minor resistance may continue, the regime has ample means to suppress any serious outbreaks.]

[South Vietnam: Communist guerrilla forces constitute an increasing military threat and appear to intend to develop a major base of operations in the plateau area of central South Vietnam bordering Laos.]

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[REDACTED]

Prospects for Resumption of French-Algerian Negotiations

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Abdelkadar Chanderli, the rebel representative in New York, while confirming to US officials that the PAG would seek to resume negotiations "whenever the French are ready," added that the PAG did not expect them to begin much before the end of October.]

[A member of the French delegation to the UN stated early this month that he had found the Foreign Ministry in Paris concerned lest the Algerians not agree to early renewal of the talks. Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe told a US Embassy official on 13 September that he considered it might still be possible to resolve the Algerian matter in a "normal way, by negotiation," but at the time did not think the rebels were in any hurry to start talks. He also thought, however, that there is a possibility the rebels may facilitate French efforts to inaugurate a transition of power in Algeria by giving the "green light" to Moslems to be appointed to the proposed provisional executive body. Joxe was somewhat pessimistic, partly because he felt that De Gaulle's 5 September press conference remarks, minimizing the importance of sovereignty over the Sahara as a negotiating issue, would "complicate" the French negotiators' task when and if talks are resumed.]

[Vice Premier Belkacem Krim admitted to the US ambassador in Tunis on 13 September that De Gaulle's statement on the Sahara facilitated a resumption of talks, but he indicated that the rebels were suspicious of De Gaulle's "mystical" language. Krim said specifically that the PAG must be certain that "military servitude" or dangers to security are not hidden in De Gaulle's references to airfields for French communications with Black Africa, or French retention of nuclear]

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[testing facilities. Chanderli said on 18 September that arrangements could easily be made for civil air activities and military overflights or refueling privileges, but that if De Gaulle contemplated maintaining military enclaves in the Sahara, the PAG would consider its sovereignty involved and would refuse.]

[Both Krim and Chanderli also indicated that rebel leaders are willing to cooperate on transitional arrangements for the transfer of power in Algeria, but Chanderli stressed that this cooperation would be forthcoming only after successful negotiations.]

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The Situation in Ghana

Gbedemah [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Minister of Agriculture Botsio, who was once Gbedemah's chief rival for influence within the ruling Convention People's party (CPP), and Chief Justice Korsah had been aligned with him in the stormy cabinet session. Aligned with Adamafio against the Gbedemah group was John Tettegah, the anti-Western head of Ghana's Trades Union Congress (TUC) who has long been an advocate of expanded ties with the Soviet bloc. Minister of Transport and Communications Edusei, an opportunist who recently seemed to be throwing his considerable influence against the extremists, was said to have remained neutral.

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Gbedemah [REDACTED] also demanded the dismissal of Adamafio and the relaxation of Ghana's preventive detention act. Some 300 critics of the Nkrumah regime--mostly leaders of the opposition United party--are presently imprisoned under this law. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gbedemah and his allies also argued strongly, at another cabinet meeting held on 19 September, against acceptance of most of the aid offers--embracing some 350 separate projects--Nkrumah is said to have received during his recent lengthy visit to the bloc.

Nkrumah's appeal to the strikers was contained in a statement issued on 17 September--the day following his return from the bloc. After announcing the revocation of the limited state of emergency proclaimed in his absence and the release of all persons arrested in connection with the strikes, Nkrumah exhorted the participants to return to their jobs by the morning of 19 September. However, hard-core elements of the strike movement--the railway and harbor workers in the seaport of Takoradi--refused to yield until Nkrumah gives assurances that concessions to the workers' demands will be forthcoming. In the face of this defiance, Nkrumah now appears to be debating the use of force against the strikers. Such action is almost certainly being urged by the regime's left-wing leaders, who have publicly condemned the strike as a "counterrevolutionary" effort aided by foreign "imperialists." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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South Korea Seeking Early Settlement With Japan

Vice Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin implied to US Minister Green in Seoul on 19 September that Korea suspects Tokyo is not now interested in a settlement. Seoul's suspicions are based on the assumption that if the Japanese Government wants agreement, it would prevent opposition Socialist plans to demonstrate against the negotiations. Pak also told Green that if the Japanese block a settlement at this time, Seoul probably will not attempt another rapprochement for some years. South Korea's military leaders are less restricted by public anti-Japanese sentiment than previous governments, but they can ill afford to lay themselves open to charges of selling out Korea's interests to Japan.

The regime probably is prepared to scale down former demands for repayment of claims and to substitute a conservation agreement for the "Rhee line"--a line extending between 20 and 200 miles off the Korean coast inside which Seoul has barred Japanese fishing--providing Tokyo agrees to a settlement that the regime can represent domestically as a diplomatic victory.

Pak told Green that former acting president Huh Chung probably would head the South Korean delegation if Tokyo agreed to open negotiations. He hoped that the Japanese would name a negotiator of equal stature, preferably former Prime Minister Kishi. Huh is a hard bargainer but understands the limitations within which both sides must negotiate if a settlement is to be concluded. He at one time served in a similar capacity under Rhee and served as acting chief of state immediately following Rhee's ouster.

The Japanese are resisting the Korean suggestions that major problems--property claims and the Rhee fishing line--be handled in high-level "political" discussions rather than in technical committees as heretofore. Any enthusiasm Tokyo

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may have had about expediting an agreement with the South Korean military regime probably has been dispelled by renewed seizures of Japanese fishing vessels and by Seoul's advance notice that it would seek \$800,000,000 in property claims. The Japanese consider this figure excessive and are offering \$50,000,000 in claims together with an unspecified amount of "economic cooperation." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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